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ABSTRACT 
Since the watershed events of September 11, 2001, the United States military has 
been engaged in fighting what has been recognized as a highly organized and networked 
global insurgency.  These global insurgents have sought to take advantage of all the 
technological advances available in the current information age, combined with the 
innovative and adaptive advantages of networked organizations.   
This study asks two questions: 1.) How can global insurgent networks be 
countered; and 2.) Where might the most appropriate personnel to man a global U.S. 
counter-insurgent network be found? This thesis asserts that organizational 
considerations matter and that for the U.S. military to have the best chance to defeat these 
global insurgent networks it must further develop small, adaptive human networks of its 
own.  Secondly, the authors will demonstrate that there exists within the Army Special 
Forces field grade officer population the capability and capacity to man and lead a small, 
yet globally dispersed counter-insurgent network.   
These arguments will be evidenced by an examination of the networked aspects of 
the global insurgency, hierarchical aspects of the U.S. military and finally the specific 
manpower data within the Army Special Forces officer population.  What is still needed 
in the evolving global war on terror, and this study hopes to contribute, is a small turn of 
mind towards applying networked counter-terror organizations against a very serious 
irregular, networked threat.  To this end, the authors will propose the establishment of a 
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FOREWORD 
There is an old Mongol saying, that “with forty men you can shake the world.”  The 
adage hints at a powerful truth about war:  very often, “the few” makes a big difference.  In 
the Mongols’ own experience, their “hordes” were almost always significantly outnumbered 
in their major battles.  Yet they emerged victorious, again and again, carving out the largest 
empire the world has ever seen. 
“The few” have appeared and reappeared many times throughout history, even more 
dramatically than in the Mongol case.  One of the best examples was at Gettysburg, where 
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlin turned the tide of battle at the critical moment – with just the 
few hundred fighters of his Maine Regiment attacking and defeating a numerically far 
superior foe. 
But perhaps 1940 was the most auspicious year for “the few” as, even in a very big 
war, small numbers of fighting men on both sides held the balance between victory and 
defeat.  About a thousand indefatigable RAF pilots were immortalized by Winston Churchill 
– who first observed this “phenomenon of the few” – for having won the Battle of Britain. 
At the same time, about a thousand German U-boat crewmen, in thirty-odd 
submarines, came perilously close to winning the war outright with their undersea blockade 
of Britain.  On both sides of this, the biggest war in history, the few made a powerful impact. 
  And two years later, in 1942, just as in the Mongol proverb, not many more than forty 
American dive bomber pilots – empowered by the preliminary sacrifice of about the same 
number of torpedo plane pilots – changed the course of the Pacific War at Midway. 
It is simply amazing how often, even in the largest-scale wars, small numbers of 
soldiers, sailors and airmen have wielded huge, world-shaping influence. 
And this is still true today.  In the war on terror, we have already seen the enemy 
shaking the world with the power of the few on 9/11.  The American response in Afghanistan 
late in 2001 showed that we understood the value of the few as well, with about 300 Army 
Special Forces troops toppling the Taliban.  Since then, the scale of the terror war has grown, 
largely due to the American intervention in Iraq. 
But now come Majors Walker and Deal, to remind us in their thesis of the enduring 
(and never more needed) power of the few.  They argue quite persuasively that a little more 
than 200 Army Special Forces majors, representing a “structural surplus of 0-4s” – i.e., the 
number above and beyond the typical number of jobs available for SF majors, - can be 
repurposed in creative ways to galvanize the effort to build a global counterinsurgent 
network. 
In effect, they are advancing an argument that, once again, “the few” can come to the 
fore and, in this case, find the way to victory in one of America’s most puzzling, troubling 
wars. 
If there is going to be any way to shorten the “long war,” and to improve our chances 
of victory, it will likely be found in a skillfully crafted network of “the few.”  Like the one 
they have designed in this study. 
May it be so. 
 
John Arquilla 

























Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States government has 
undertaken a fundamental reexamination of the way it protects and defends its citizens 
against transnational terrorism.  This self-examination naturally extends to the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and consequently engages the special operations forces 
(SOF) community in debate over long-term strategies for fighting what is now being 
considered a global insurgency.  This debate is healthy, relevant and necessary because of 
the emergent potential of an irregular threat and the recognition that the U.S. military is 
not optimized to fight this type of adversary.  The National Defense Strategy and 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) clearly identify this problem: “Although U.S. 
military forces maintain their predominance in traditional warfare, they must also be 
improved to address the non-traditional, asymmetric challenges of this new century.”1   
This study asks two questions: 1.) How can global insurgent networks be 
countered; and 2.) Where might the most appropriate personnel to man a global U.S. 
counter-insurgent network be found? This thesis asserts that organizational 
considerations matter and that for the U.S. military to have the best chance to defeat these 
global insurgent networks it must further develop small, adaptive human networks of its 
own.  Secondly, the authors will demonstrate that there exists within the Army Special 
Forces field grade officer population the capability and capacity to man and lead a small, 
yet globally dispersed counter-insurgent network to counter and defeat an irregular, 
networked adversary.   
These arguments will be weighed in an examination of the networked aspects of 
the global insurgency, the hierarchical aspects of the U.S. military, and finally by 
analyzing the specific manpower data within the Army Special Forces officer population.  
                                                 
1 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2006, 3.   
  2
Current operational and administrative constraints, as well as future requirements for this 
finite population of Army Special Forces officers will also be considered.   
One of the recurring themes in this thesis borrows from the work of Drs. John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, specifically their idea that “it takes a network to fight a 
network.”  In this view, SOF’s greatest capability exists in what Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
term a force of "the small and the many."2  Such a force stands the best chance of 
defeating an irregular enemy, fundamentally changing the battlefield from one in which 
the U.S. military has been asymmetrically disadvantaged, to a symmetrical contest fought 
with both direct and indirect strategies.  Once the battlefield has been leveled, with both 
actors on equal terms, the natural advantages of the U.S. military in manpower, 
technology, and resources can potentially lead to a decisive advantage in the ongoing 
conflict.  Until this occurs, traditional U.S. resource advantages will not suffice against an 
asymmetrically advantaged foe.  To this end, the authors conclude by proposing the 
establishment of a Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN).   
 
B. THESIS OUTLINE 
Before a solution can be proposed, the problem must be identified, framed, and 
defined.  To this end, Chapter II discusses the problem presented by global insurgent 
adversaries operating within a fourth generation or netwar paradigm, which highlight the 
increasing relevance of networks and social network theory. 
Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is described by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, 
USMC, in his insightful book, The Sling and the Stone.  He defines 4GW as an evolved 
form of insurgency focused not on destroying military targets, but on eroding political 
will, seeing human and technological networks as the means by which global insurgents 
seek to achieve their ends.3  The emphasis of this chapter centers on how a global 
terrorist insurgency is attempting to counter the inherent advantage of the U.S. 
                                                 
2 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). 
3 Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, 
MN: Zenith Press, 2004). 
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conventional military organization by utilizing what the respected network theorists 
Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson of the Strategic Studies Institute call "strategic 
asymmetry."4 
After the problem has been identified, Chapter II will then address the historic and 
current military predisposition for conventional warfare and the incongruity of this 
approach when engaged against a globally networked insurgency.  This will be 
accomplished through a brief historical perspective which outlines and shows anecdotally 
how irregular warfare is not new in the American military experience and how the 
organizational frame of reference matters. 
Chapter III contains the main argument of this thesis and explains the counter to 
the networked insurgent enemy identified in Chapter II.  This chapter recommends an 
alternate approach by employing Army Special Forces leaders within a small, globally 
dispersed counter-insurgent network working through, by and with host-nation counter-
parts for long periods of time.  This will allow the necessary trust and influence to 
develop between foreign populaces and security forces which will lead to real knowledge 
about the hard to reach areas and peoples where insurgents seek refuge.  This SF human 
network will be able to improve upon the capability of most DoD hierarchical 
organizations currently aligned against this networked threat.   
Additionally, this chapter will define the organizational framework of a Special 
Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN) by describing the roles and 
relationships of the nodes and hubs within this organization.  Organizational theories will 
be presented which will demonstrate the value of relocating select Special Forces field 
grade officers from the inner hierarchy of organizations and placing them at the periphery 
or edges of the network, a concept which is promoted by David Alberts and Richard 
                                                 
4 Strategic asymmetry is defined as “acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in 
order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain 
greater freedom of action…It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.”  Steven Metz and 
Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic 
Concepts (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001). 
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Hayes in their book Power to the Edge.5  This proposal also takes into consideration a 
model developed by Naval Postgraduate School professors David Tucker, Hy Rothstein, 
and Anna Simons.  Their model highlights the importance of presence, trust, influence, 
intelligence and security for U.S. personnel operating in the non-western world and will 
be used to explain the power of the network.6   
Another important aspect of this network is the belief that it should be operated 
primarily in the open.  The information revolution has made it more difficult to keep a 
secret as well as enabled a rise in the comparative value of information gained from open 
vice classified sources.  A long-term, unclassified operation could evolve over time, and 
then by exception allow for short duration, classified initiatives to be conducted without 
the risk of maintaining a long-term classified program.  This chapter will also identify 
characteristics which distinguish the proposed network and conclude by comparing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the SFGCIN with current DoD foreign engagement 
programs.   
Chapter IV presents empirical evidence which demonstrates the existence of 
considerable surplus within the U.S. Army Special Forces field-grade officer personnel 
population.  Because of the unique experience and skill-sets resident within this 
population, this surplus represents an extremely valuable and limited resource.  
Therefore, this chapter will discuss how the concepts of allocative and productive 
efficiency may apply to this dilemma.7  Robert R. Leonhard, a retired army lieutenant 
colonel and author of The Principles of War for the Information Age, borrows the 
concepts of allocative and productive efficiency from the study of economics.  He uses 
these concepts to discuss the scarcity of resources and the seemingly infinite demands 
competing for those resources as an essential dilemma within the military.  This chapter 
                                                 
5 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the Information 
Age (Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 2003). 
6 David Tucker, Hy Rothstein, and Anna Simons, (unpublished research, Defense Analysis 
Department, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 2003).  
7 Robert R. Leonhard, The Principles of War for the Information Age, (New York, Ballantine Books, 
1998).   
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provides the empirical data which illustrates how the Special Forces population of field-
grade officers has increased over the past several years, as well as projections about how 
this trend is expected to continue.   
It is the authors hope that by the end of this thesis the reader should be, if not 
convinced, at least appreciative of some simple claims presented in this study.  Mainly 
that a U.S. human network is the most appropriate organizational form to combat the 
global insurgent networks with which we are at war.  Secondly, that there exist roughly 
twice as many Army Special Forces majors (O-4) as there are traditional Special Forces 
jobs to employ these men at the height of their operationally productive careers.8  While 
it is necessary and healthy for any personnel population to have a small overage, the 
growing trend of surplus suggests there might be other, more creative ways to employ 
these special operations leaders.  A supporting assertion follows that because of the 
personnel surplus existing in the Army Special Forces field grade officer population, that 
they are the most appropriate human resource asset to put to work in the proposed 
network.  This does not mean that all the SF field grade officers working in non-
traditional SF positions are not doing valuable work, only that with a 211% overage that 
those numbers would support putting a small portion of that personnel surplus to work in 
this proposed human counter-insurgent network, optimizing their unique and critical 
unconventional warfare and counter-insurgent skill-sets.   
                                                 
8 The empirical evidence for this claim will be presented, examined, and explained in detail in chapter 
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II. DEFINING THE THREAT – AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
The complexity of the future security environment is rooted in global and 
regional ideological and political struggles.  These struggles will challenge 
traditional US military approaches.  Faced with the conventional 
warfighting capacity of the United States, our adversaries will likely 
choose to fight using a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic and 
traditional capabilities as a way to achieve their strategic objectives.  The 
strategy of our adversaries will be to subvert, attrite, and exhaust us rather 
than defeat us militarily.  They will seek to undermine and erode the 
national power, influence, and will of the United States and its strategic 
partners.  Our adversaries will continue to wage IW (Irregular Warfare) 
against us until we demonstrate the same competency in IW that we 
demonstrate in conventional warfighting.9 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
Historian Walter Laqueur begins Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study with   
one of the earliest references to irregular warriors and guerrilla tactics found in recorded 
history.   Set in the fifteenth century B.C., the passage contains an ancient Hittite king's 
complaint that "the irregulars did not dare to attack me in the daylight and preferred to 
fall on me by night.”10  This chapter will demonstrate that while guerrilla tactics have 
remained fundamentally unchanged since classical antiquity, what gives the modern 
guerrilla (or global insurgent) his disruptive and destructive power is the organizational 
networked form.  To accomplish this, concepts of organization theory will be explained 
and then applied to what is known about key transnational terrorist groups as well as 
current U.S. military organizational forms and strategies.  Finally the traditional 
hierarchical organizational structure of the U.S. military will be evidenced as less 
appropriate in the long war because of the inherent inefficiencies with this type of  
                                                 
9 United States Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW JOC) 
(Washington, DC: Version 1.0, January 2007), 15-16. 
10 Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 1.   
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organization when juxtaposed against a network.  This organizational disadvantage poses 
challenges which hinder many current military efforts in the protracted campaign against 
terrorist networks. 
 
B. IDENTIFYING THE THREAT 
 
1.  The Old – Guerrilla Tactics 
With so much written about a new form of warfare in the post-9/11 era, it is 
important to distinguish exactly what is new and what is not.11   Guerrilla warfare tactics 
have been relatively unchanged since the Hittite king was ambushed over three thousand 
years ago.  Guerrilla tactics have always involved a struggle of the weak against the 
strong, the irregular against regular martial forces.  This fundamental relationship is one 
of asymmetry.12 
Colonel C.E. Callwell described guerrilla tactics in his treatise, Small Wars as 
“shirk[ing] engagements in the open.  Organization they had little or none… [and they] 
gave the regular troops much trouble.”13  The British Special Operations Executive 
veteran, James Eliot Cross, highlighted clandestine sabotage and subversion as key 
tactics of guerrilla warfare.  He stated that, “[t]he military weakness of guerrillas and 
rebels. . . forces them to avoid battle with official forces except through ambushes, 
assassinations, and hit and run raiding. . . .”14  This speaks to the asymmetric aspects 
which have always epitomized guerrilla tactics.  While the guerrilla tactics of ambush, 
sabotage and subversion, kidnapping, assassination, and terrorism have most often been a 
part of guerrilla warfare, it was the thoughts of Mao Zedong on the political implication 
                                                 
11 For example: Irregular Warfare as articulated in the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IW 
JOC). 
12 Metz and Johnson further describe asymmetry as “the methodology of the weak against the strong.  
It is the use of disparity between contending parties to gain advantage.”, 5-6. 
13 C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd ed. (Lincoln and London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1996), 31. 
14 James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows: The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 58. 
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of guerrilla warfare in the middle of the 20th century which gave revolutionary and 
guerrilla warfare a new focus and audience.  Mao’s famous statement that “politics is war 
without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed”15 can be easily understood as a 
paraphrase of Clausewitz’s famous adage that “war is merely the continuation of policy 
by other means.”16  Mao and Clausewitz both recognized the infrangible bond between 
policy and war, yet it was Mao who took the idea on the centrality of a political 
undertaking, “[t]he problem of political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed 
of the utmost importance. . . political mobilization is the most fundamental condition for 
winning the war.”17  This is where a truly new aspect of guerrilla warfare began to 
emerge.   While the tactics of the guerrilla remained constant, a new understanding of the 
primacy of political will in an insurgency was born and developed by Mao’s “Peoples 
War”.  Colonel Thomas X. Hammes in his insightful book, The Sling and the Stone, 
credits Mao’s “Peoples War” with the birth of a new generation of warfare, a Fourth 
Generation Warfare (4GW).18  A point of departure for the next section will concentrate 
on this new generation of war and what is central to understanding and defeating a 
protagonist operating in 4GW – the network. 
 
2.  The New – The Irregular Networked Threat 
Most often in the field of counter-terrorism the term terror network is discussed 
as if its mere label as a network conveys a level of understanding unique to a terrorist 
organization.  The problem arises in the obvious variety and complexity of the multitude 
of terrorist organizations with which the U.S. is concerned.  The broadness of the term 
describes nothing more than a basic concept of an inter-connected organization.  Much 
                                                 
15 Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare (Baltimore, Md: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 
1992), 55. 
16 Carl Von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
17 Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: on War in the 21st Century, 51. 
18 Hammes further explains 4GW as utilizing “all available networks – political, economic, social, and 
military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” The Sling and the Stone: on War in the 21st Century, 
2. 
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more is needed to understand the complexity of a network if the counter-terrorism 
community is to grasp this important aspect of modern terrorist organizations.  To better 
know the enemy, this section will utilize an organizational frame of reference to analyze 
the networked organizational form and its inherent potential within an era of 4GW.   
 
a. Inside the Network 
The forensic psychiatrist and former U.S. Foreign Service officer, Marc 
Sageman conducted primary source research during his time in Islamabad while working 
with Afghanistan’s mujahedin.  Sageman applied social network analysis to study 
empirical data gathered on global Salafi jihadis’19 relationships and ties to others in their 
networks.  This work led to new insights and understanding of the motivations and ways 
individuals joined the global Salafi jihad. The most valuable aspect of Sageman’s book, 
Understanding Terror Networks, for the purposes of this thesis, falls within his analysis 
and explanation of networks.   
Sageman states that “[a] group of people can be viewed as a network, a 
collection of nodes connected through links.  Some nodes are more popular and are 
attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes.  These more 
connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network”20  To 
visualize this concept, Figure 1 depicts Drs. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldts’ three 
basic networked forms:  the chain or line network, the hub, star, or wheel network, and 
the all-channel or full-matrix network.21 
                                                 
19 Marc Sageman defines global Salafi jihad as “an Islamic revivalist social movement.  It consists of 
people and organizations in various degrees of formalization who share the same ideology and mission.”  
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 1. 
20 Ibid., 137. 
21 John Arquilla, and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 7-8. 
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Figure 1.   Three Basic Types of Networks 
 
The chain or line network is characterized by end-to-end movement of 
people, goods or information along a line through intermediate nodes.  The hub, star, or 
wheel network is much like a franchise in which actors are connected by a central node 
and “must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other."22  
Finally, the all-channel or full matrix network, topographically, is a system in which 
everyone is connected to everyone else with the authority to move information or goods 
in any direction.23 
To further our understanding of networks, Sageman informs us that within 
the varied population of organized terrorist groups, there exist many different types of 
networks.  Some are dominated by a few tightly connected hubs (hierarchal) while other 
cores or hubs are connected to their field lieutenants by weak links (decentralized).24  
Sageman also intones that networks are not static, but evolving, and that how they grow 
over time informs their potential.25  
Sageman provides the example of how the “growth of [a] network [is] not 
a random process but one of preferential attachment, meaning that [how] a new node will 
connect to any given node is proportional to the number of its existing links” or a “small 
world” network.26  He provides the example of internet traffic on CNN, Google, or 
                                                 
22 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 7.  
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Sageman, 137 – 138. 
25 Ibid., 140. 
26 Ibid. 
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Yahoo websites – these “giant hubs . . .  receive far more ‘hits’ than most other web sites.  
This approximates the structures of the two Arab clusters of the global Salafi Jihad.”27  
So naturally, the more well-known the hub, the more likely it will be to attract new 
nodes. The intent of this section is not to get into specific analysis of the various terrorist 
“clusters” which comprise the global Salafi jihad, but to provide an organizational frame 
of reference to analyze enemy networks.  
Besides the idea of “small world” networks, Sageman also introduces the 
idea of “geographical distribution” which suggests that rather than a top-down building 
plan; small world networks are capable of “spontaneous self-organization. . . [by] self-
recruits, establishing clusters of mujahedin who built upon preexisting linkages to the 
jihad.”28  This suggests that another powerful aspect of these networks is the lack of a 
need for an organized recruit infrastructure because of a “like-minded” community which 
seeks out linkages to the network from the bottom up.   
Sageman also adds the concept of “embeddedness,” which refers to “the 
rich nexus of social and economic linkages between members of an organization and its 
environment.”29  This is an important aspect of social network theory because it explains 
the relationship between a network and society, shared collective behavior, and the 
concern of individuals to either maintain or sever these social bonds.  The repercussions 
either work to keep a member in a small world network or if these links are severed (lack 
of embeddedness), frees the individual to establish weak links to new networks.30 
 
b. The Old Guerrilla in the Information Age 
The impact of the current information revolution with which transnational 
terror organizations now operate is critical to understanding terror networks’ potential to 
bridge old divides with new technology.  Within the information age, Sageman continues 
                                                 
27 Sageman, 140. 
28 Ibid., 142. 
29 Ibid., 146. 
30 Ibid. 
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to highlight the necessity of close, intense and intimate relationships required for 
religious terror movements to have trust and commitment from each member.  In the past, 
because of the traditional time and distance it took to meet and communicate, it was not 
as easy for these isolated insurgents to maintain current, frequent, and detailed 
correspondence.  Sageman points out that:  
 
the more isolated the fanatic, the more likely it was that his fanaticism 
would fade.  Enthusiasm for one’s task is difficult to preserve in a 
vacuum.  The revolution in communication technology in the 1990s has 
dramatically changed this situation.31 
 
This new communication technology has been a boon for the many 
disparate and formerly isolated terror organizations, with the “impact on network 
topology”32 for these groups not yet fully realized.  One aspect of the information age is 
the impact of satellite phone communication and internet connectivity which have made 
it easier to communicate directives, propaganda and ideas than at any previous time in 
history – the links of a global network that move with the press of a button.  This has 
resulted in the creation of a virtual community where disparate individuals (nodes) can be 
exposed to ideas and build basic connections (links) to others, through cyberspace, slowly 
building a network from the bottom up and with very little chance of exposure.  Thus the 
extremely difficult task of building a clandestine insurgent network has been made much 
more feasible with the advantages available in the information age.   
These are some of the key aspects which empower a new generation of 
guerrillas operating in fourth generational warfare.  The power of a networked form 
operating in the information age has best been articulated by what Drs. John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt refer to as netwar.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt define netwar as: 
 
                                                 
31 Sageman, 158. 
32 Ibid., 164. 
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. . . an emerging mode of conflict at societal levels, involving measures 
short of war, in which the protagonists use – indeed, depend on using – 
network forms of organization [emphasis added], doctrine, strategy, and 
communication.  These protagonists generally consist of dispersed, often 
small groups who agree to communicate, coordinate, and act in an 
internetted manner, often without precise central leadership or 
headquarters.  Decision-making may be deliberately decentralized and 
dispersed.33 
 
The essential point is the potential of these irregular networked threats. 
According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the power of actors to operate in autonomous 
networks, harnessing information at high speeds in a globalized and connected world, 
will result in a new form of global terror organization able to adapt and evolve faster than 
its opposition—the U.S. military’s hierarchical counter-terror organizations.34 The old, 
familiar guerrilla now acts outside of a traditional nation-state framework and with the 
advantages of a networked organization on a global scale. To succeed against a 
networked terror organization, Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue, requires “effective 
interagency approaches, which by their nature involve networked structures.”35  
Networked terrorists are determined and unified in their goals of 
“overthrowing the existing world structure, destroying the United States and instituting in 
its place al-Qaeda’s version of the next Islamic caliphate.”36  The advantages of the 
networked form, operating within the information age, have provided al-Qaeda and their 
affiliates a much greater chance of fulfilling their dire goal.   
 
                                                 
33 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 
Age (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), 277. For more on netwar, see John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, 
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001).  
34 Ibid., 28. 
35 Arquilla, and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 78. 
36 Kimbra L. Fishell, “Challenging the Hegemon: Al Qaeda’s Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent 
Warfare onto the Global Arena.” In Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, ed. Robert J. Bunker, 1st 
ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 117. 
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The historians and theorists, Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett 
reach many fascinating conclusions at the end of their study of military innovation in the 
interwar period between the first and second world wars.  One important finding 
regarding innovation was that “[i]nnovation in tactics and operational concepts 
[emphasis added] can prove as important on the battlefield as changes in equipment.”37 
Murray and Millet further find that most innovation is evolutionary (bottom-up) vice 
revolutionary (top-down) and that “evolutionary innovation depends on organizational 
focus over a sustained period of time.”38 
The good news is that innovation has and is occurring since the events of 
September 11, 2001.  Even more promising is the fact that the U.S. military and 
especially the special operations community possess the appropriate human capital, 
material and technological resources to counter this determined adversary.  What is still 
needed and this study hopes to contribute - is a small turn of mind towards applying 
networked counter-insurgent organizations against a very serious irregular, networked 
threat.   
 
C. THE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 
 
1.  Historical Background 
Irregular actors practicing guerrilla warfare have been part of the U.S. military 
experience even before colonial times.  America’s experiences in asymmetric warfare 
began as early as the French and Indian Wars, where small, irregular bands of raiders 
fought limited skirmishes in the service of either French or British interests for control of 
the continent.  The American tradition of irregular warfare continued with the American 
Revolution, when the Continental Army harassed its better-armed and better-trained 
opponents with guerrilla-style tactics.  Arquilla notes that, 
                                                 
37 Williamson Murray and Allan Reed Millett, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 306. 
38 Ibid., 306, 309. 
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. . . during the Revolution, American forces demonstrated a penchant for 
protracted guerrilla warfare in the remarkable campaign in the South, 
which was won, and won freedom for the colonies, despite the absence of 
victory in open battle against the British.39 
 
Despite the American ability to fight unconventional, less than total war campaigns and 
win, General Washington felt that to be taken seriously as a world power, the Continental 
Army needed to evolve into a conventional fighting force.  Thomas Adams notes that 
“when George Washington took command of the fledgling Continental Army, he made it 
his first order of business to create an army that could fight in the properly accepted 
‘European’ manner of its British opponents.”40  This attached the United States to a 
conventional model despite its obvious unsuitability in various campaigns, including the 
frontier wars in the late nineteenth century.41   
Having long idealized the European tradition of the set-piece battle, the U.S. 
emerged as the preeminent practitioner of what historian Edward Luttwak calls attritional 
warfare.42  The perceived supremacy of conventional, attritional warfare has led to the 
idea that this is the “American” way of war.  Despite American involvement in many 
small wars, U.S. doctrine continued to neglect unconventional warfare until well into the 
                                                 
39 John Arquilla, ed. From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (New 
York: University Press of America, 1996), 55. 
40 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 27. 
41 Adams notes that "Though frequently criticized, the [frontier army's] standard offensive methods 
were never changed.  Heavy columns…locked to slow moving supply trains, continued to crawl about the 
vast western distances in search of an enemy who could scatter and vanish almost instantly." Adams, 28. 
42 Luttwak proposes a spectrum ranging from attritional to relational-maneuver warfare.  He equates 
attritional warfare with an army focused more on its own internal administration and operation and less on 
the external environment.  “By contrast, the closer they are to the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum, 
the more armed forces will tend to be outer-regarding.”  For further insight into attritional and relational-
maneuver warfare see Edward N. Luttwak, "Notes on  Low-Intensity Warfare," Parameters, December 
1983.  
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twentieth century.  According to Adams, “Every experience outside the conventional 
model…was treated as an aberration.”43  
Today, a daunting challenge for the U.S. military is to look back and reflect on its 
storied and successful history of irregular or unconventional warfare.  In the information 
age, irregular actors’ potential to disrupt and destroy is magnified by their mastery of 
networked organizations and the acephelous nature of the network.  For the U.S. military 
to succeed against these modern, irregular enemies, it must relearn how to fight and win 
small wars.  One way to accomplish this goal would be to affect a simple shift in 
organizational and human resource perspective which could have a significant impact in a 
long, protracted struggle.  In the next section, the organizational frame of reference will 
illustrate the inherent disadvantages of a large, hierarchical institution trying to keep pace 
with the innovation and adaptability of a networked terror organization.   
 
2.  Hierarchy versus the Network 
 
a. The Hierarchy 
The military, like most government agencies, is what Professor Henry 
Mintzberg, renowned author and organizational theorist, refers to as a machine 
bureaucracy.  A machine bureaucracy consists of a large hierarchy which is characterized 
by its rigid departmentalization, standardization, and centralization.44  This type of 
structure is most effective in a simple and stable environment.  While the authors 
understand the inherent complexity and variance present in war, this argument is being 
considered within an organizational, not operational perspective.  For example, during the 
Cold War, the former Soviet Union posed the single greatest threat to the security of the 
United States.  From an organizational standpoint, the Soviet military posed a 
symmetrical threat to the U.S. military in that they were both large, modern conventional 
                                                 
43 Adams, 28. 
44 For a more thorough explanation of organizational characteristics and configurations see Henry 
Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review, (Jan-Feb 1981): 7. 
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force structures.  The U.S. weapon systems and set-piece battle strategies shared very 
similar constructs.  This created a relatively simple and stable environment which lasted 
for over four decades, an environment for which a machine bureaucracy was well suited. 
One of the primary problems associated with a large, machine bureaucracy 
is its inadaptability.  This inability to adapt is what makes machine bureaucracies less 
flexible than properly networked organizations.  According to Bunker, 
  
This allows for adaptive behavior to take place during operational 
situations.  When this is combined with the greater information processing 
speed of the network structure, it helps to explain why they can easily 
outdistance hierarchical structures and get inside their [decision cycles].45  
  
Bunker cites Al-Qaeda as an example of a network that has been able to 
adapt as a result of its “losing and learning doctrine” and “goal oriented and not rule 
oriented” protocols.  The first protocol is based on the premise that unsuccessful 
operations are not necessarily failures as long as the organization learns and does not 
repeat the same mistakes.  The latter focuses the organization on the end-state and not the 
means.  “If one form of attack or technique fails then others will be tried.  These 
protocols have allowed Al-Qaeda to become a network that learns.”46 
 
b. The Network 
A network, on the other hand is most closely aligned with what Mintzberg 
refers to as an adhocracy.  An adhocracy is a complex, non-standardized organization 
which is tremendously fluid in structure and relies on mutual adjustment for coordination 
among its components.  This type of organization is well suited to a complex and 
dynamic environment.  Unlike a hierarchical organization where power is concentrated at 
                                                 
45 Matt Begert, “Operational Combat Analysis of the Al Qaeda Network,” in Networks, Terrorism and 
Global Insurgency, ed. Robert J. Bunker, 1st ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 165. 
46 Ibid., 166. 
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the top, power within an adhocracy is distributed throughout the structure and is based on 
expertise rather than authority.47  Mintzberg states: 
 
In a project structure, strategy is not formulated from above and then 
implemented lower down; rather, it evolves by virtue of the multitude of 
decisions made for the projects themselves.  In other words, the adhocracy 
is continually developing its strategy as it accepts and works out new 
projects, the creative results of which can never be predicted.  And so 
everyone who gets involved in the project work – and in the adhocracy 
that can mean virtually everyone – becomes a strategy maker.48 
 
While these characteristics provide an adhocracy with many advantages in 
the constantly evolving insurgent threat environment, like any organizational structure, an 
adhocracy also has its disadvantages.  The primary limitation of this type of organization 
is its inefficiency.  “Adhocracy can do no ordinary thing well.  But it is extraordinary at 
innovation.”49  So while adhocracies might not be best suited to perform repetitive, 
administrative organizational tasks, they are very well suited to innovate and adapt, 
keeping pace with nimble terrorist networks. 
As previously mentioned, a machine bureaucracy is most efficient when 
operating in a simple and stable environment.  Unfortunately, the environment in which 
the U.S. military must operate today is much more uncertain.  With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the dawning of the information age, and the emergence of many new 
challenges posed by a networked adversary, the U.S. military must now operate within an 
increasingly complex and unstable environment for which a network or adhocracy is 
much better suited.  This concept is already recognized in the National Military Strategy: 
                                                 
47 Mintzberg, 10-12. 
48 Ibid., 11. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
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“It is imperative that the Armed Forces retain the ability to contend with the principal 
characteristic of the security environment – uncertainty.”50  
The authors believe that it is possible for a nimble, networked organization 
to operate within a large military hierarchy – specifically to counter an irregular 
networked threat in an uncertain environment.   
 
c.  Challenges to Hierarchy from the Network 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest that hierarchies face three organizational 
challenges in confronting networks.  These challenges must be confronted in order to 
develop new and better methods against terror networks.  The first challenge is that 
“hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks.”  The second is that “it takes 
networks to fight networks.”  Finally, Arquilla and Ronfeldt posit that “whoever masters 
the network form first and best will gain major advantages.”51 
The first point is supported by Marc Sageman’s empirical research which 
led him to state that: “flexibility and local initiative of small-world networks and cliques 
contrast with the rigidity of hierarchies, which do not adapt well to ambiguity but are 
excellent at exerting control.”52  The rigidity of organizational hierarchies, 
institutionalized standard operating procedures, and entrenched action approval 
mechanisms at the operator, managerial, and executive level – all contribute to 
organizations that function well in performing familiar, repetitive tasks.  However, such 
organizations are not very good at dealing with new tasks.53  This inadaptability makes it 
difficult for large hierarchical organizations to implement institutional changes.  Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt cite examples of the difficulties hierarchies encounter when fighting 
                                                 
50 United States Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of 
America, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 7. 
51 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 15. 
52 Sageman, 165. 
53 Mintzberg, 7-8. 
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networks, such as the “failings of many governments to defeat transnational criminal 
cartels engaged in drug smuggling.”54   
The second point, that it takes networks to fight networks, is supported by 
Robert J. Bunker and Matt Begert’s findings in their essay Operational Combat Analysis 
of the Al Qaeda Network.  Bunker and Begert assert that the web-like structure between 
various cells and nodes creates much greater connectivity resulting in a flatter and more 
efficient organization.  “Because the majority (if not all) of the cells and nodes can link to 
each other directly, middle layers are done away with, resulting in flat information 
integration.”55  Bunker and Begert also point out the advantages of networks over 
hierarchies when it comes to information flow, which they attribute to an information 
multiplier effect.  They predict that,  
 
. . . over time, the ‘information multiplier’ will grow even more 
pronounced over that of hierarchies with the advent of broadband 
communications that will provide a greater initial baseline of information 
being sent into an organization.  Networks, unlike hierarchies, will be 
better suited to handle these increased information flows.  Real-time 
information being received by those who can immediately capitalize upon 
it also takes place as organization structure allows processing speeds to 
increase.56   
 
This information advantage will only become more pronounced as the amount and 
complexity of relevant data in the contemporary operating environment continues to 
grow.  
                                                 
54 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 15. 
55 Bunker and Begert, 147. 
56 Ibid., 153. 
  22
Another considerable advantage of a network over a hierarchy is explained 
by Bunker and Begert’s belief that the network, unlike a hierarchy, will acquire 
“increasing returns as [it] expands.”57  They posit that, 
 
As they grow, network structures operate in a manner contrary to 
hierarchical structures.  Whereas hierarchies see diminishing returns as 
they grow too large, networks see increasing returns and value.  The best 
example of increasing returns can be seen with a computer connected to 
the Internet.  One or two computers linked online have basically no value 
but millions of computers are a different story.58   
 
This concept of a vast network, comprised of many small nodes is exactly inline with the 
power of a network of the small and the many proposed in this thesis and stands the best 
chance of countering the advantage of our networked, insurgent adversaries.   
Finally, the advantage of mastering network forms first suggests that al-
Qaeda has a head start in this area.   However, the lessons learned in the opening rounds 
of this new era of warfare might be improved upon by an informational and 
organizationally flexible Special Forces organization.  
  
D. CONCLUSION 
While guerrilla tactics have remained fundamentally unchanged since antiquity, 
characterized by what James Elliot Cross referred to as, “[the] military weakness of 
guerrillas and rebels which forces them to avoid battle with official forces except through 
ambushes, assassinations, and hit and run raiding. . . .”59  What is differentiated in the 
modern era for guerrillas or insurgents is the enhanced disruptive and destructive power 
enabled by the organizationally networked form.  The difficulty of a hierarchical 
organization to adapt to complex and varied tasks demonstrates the inherent inadequacies 
                                                 
57 Bunker and Begert, 162. 
58 Ibid. 
 59 Cross, 58. 
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of this type of organization when operating in the ambiguous and uncertain environment 
of counter-insurgency.  The potential of the information age empowers an innovative and 
adaptive insurgent network which demands an innovative and adaptive network to defeat 
it.  The next step in the ongoing global war on terror will require that Special Operations 
leaders continue to embrace the challenges and opportunities of the information age and 
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III. A NEW STRATEGY IN THE NEXT PHASE OF THE LONG 
WAR: SPECIAL FORCES HUMAN NETWORKS 
Today, those who want to defend against netwar will, increasingly, have to 
adopt weapons, strategies, and organizational designs like those of their 
adversaries.  This does not mean mirroring the adversary, but rather 
learning to draw on the same design principles that he has already learned 
about the rise of network forms in the information age.  It should not be 
necessary, or desirable, to replace all hierarchies with networks.  Rather 
the challenge will be to blend these two forms skillfully, while retaining 
enough central authority to encourage and enforce adherence to truly 
networked processes.60  
 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GLOBAL COUNTER-
INSURGENT NETWORK (SFGCIN) 
The Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network (SFGCIN) proposed in 
this chapter resolves two dilemmas.  The first is the need for a small, but widely 
distributed human network to counter the global insurgent network.  The second is the 
need to maximize the human resource pool surplus of SF field-grade officers not 
employed to maximum effect.  Although mid-level and senior SF officers currently fill 
hundreds of staff positions throughout the Army, these staff positions are far removed 
from the insurgent threat environment.  The authors believe that some members of this 
human resource pool would be better employed within an appropriately-structured 
network operating within and against the insurgent threat environment.  
Special Forces officers are assessed, selected, trained, educated, and experienced 
in unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency principles, which gives them skills and 
attributes different from other Army officer populations.  One can imagine an empowered 
network for the next phase of the Global War on Terror where nearly every developing 
country deemed at risk of becoming a safe haven for the global insurgents, is assigned a 
team(s) led by experienced SF officers, each with well over ten years of experience, who 
                                                 
60 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar, 82.   
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can speak the native language, understand the complex and nuanced aspects of UW and 
counter-insurgency as well as strategic, operational, and tactical imperatives.  
The tradition of sending uniquely qualified individuals into foreign lands with 
ambiguous guidance is exemplified by Milton E. Miles and his World War II “Yangtze 
Raiders” in China as well as the famous exploits of T. E. Lawrence, who was sent into 
the desert in 1916 by Britain to report on Arab nationalist movements.61  Although this 
patient, ambiguous and long-term approach does not fit neatly into today’s more effects-
based, attritional military strategies, much of unconventional warfare and counter-
insurgency lies outside more conventional military frames of reference. 
The longevity and constancy required of the personnel manning the network for, 
at a minimum of two to three years is crucial.  Serving for several years as advisors to a 
host nation’s field command, authorized to live with and share the risks of their host-
nation counterparts, in the most relevant counter-insurgent military units, would give SF 
unconventional warfare experts time to build trust and relationships with key military and 
government decision makers.     
Risk-to-gain analysis for different countries would be required for operations, but 
a network-based approach could be applied across the entire spectrum of conflict, from 
peacetime engagement through uncertain or hostile environments.  Currently many U.S. 
military-to-military engagement programs are short-term in duration, or longer-term but 
lack the networked topography to take advantage of the relationships and information 
gleaned from more sustained missions.  
This chapter contains the main argument of the thesis, which is that a nimble 
network of Special Forces field grade officers is the best tool to counter a determined, 
networked terrorist enemy.  These factors lead to trust and eventually allow the network 
to exert influence on host-nation partners.  In addition, the proposed network would be 
                                                 
61 Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles recounts Admiral King’s guidance launching him on his World War 
II mission in 1941. “You are to go to China and set up some bases as soon as you can.  The main idea is to 
prepare the China coast in any way you can for U.S. Navy landings in three or four years [emphasis 
added].  In the meantime, do whatever you can to help the Navy and heckle the Japanese.” Milton E. Miles 
and Hawthorne Daniel, A Different Kind of War, 1st ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1967), 18. 
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established and operate primarily in the unclassified arena.  The difficulty of maintaining 
a classified initiative for a long period is discussed later in the chapter.   
 
B. THE NETWORK  
 
1.  Explaining the Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network  
 
a. The Nodes 
Chapter II discussed the type of networked insurgent enemy which 
currently challenges the U.S. military and the need to counter that very real threat with a 
better network of our own.  This section focuses on the characteristics and roles of the 
nodes for the proposed network. 
David Alberts and Richard Hayes have studied and written on the concept 
of network centric warfare (NCW) in their book, Power to the Edge.  They stress, among 
other things, the important role experience and seniority play depending on their location 
within a network.  They specifically examine the effects of moving senior personnel from 
the inner hierarchy of organizations to the periphery or the edges of a network. 62 Alberts 
and Hayes state that 
 
Power to the edge involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of 
an organization (where the organization interacts with its operating 
environment. . .) Edge organizations move senior personnel into roles that 
place them at the edge.  They often reduce the need for middle managers 
whose role is to manage constraints and control measures.63 
 
The movement of field-grade officers causes more latitude to be entrusted 
to an edge organization. Thus “expanding access to information and the elimination of 
                                                 
62 Network Centric Warfare “describes how information coupled with changes in C2 (command and 
control) can transform military organization.”  Alberts and Hayes, xix.  
63 Ibid., 5. 
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unnecessary constraints” results in a more responsive and efficient organization.64  This 
idea of moving more senior operators closer to the edge of a network is shared in the 
authors’ concept of field-grade officers manning the nodes of the proposed network. This 
is where the network interacts with the threat environment, filtering and understanding 
foreign cultural and human terrains, often where frustration arises for many U.S. military 
and intelligence organizations.   
It is at the edge of the SFGCIN where the nodes would be located as small 
teams.  At this stage of concept development it is not important to determine the exact 
configuration of these teams, as that should depend on the unique cultural, environmental 
and operational aspects of each country or region of employment.  What is most 
important is that these teams are led by a Special Forces field-grade officer with 
experience and aptitude for unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency and that the 
nodes live and operate for the majority of their time in the hinterlands and un-governed 
regions of each respective country.65  A starting point would have each team comprised 
of four to five men with the obvious specialties of: intelligence analysis, advanced special 
operations qualifications and other, more sensitive skill-sets.  Their job would be to build 
relationships (links) with their host nation counterparts, learning their operating 
environment from their native counter-part’s perspective and acting as sensors and 
collectors (nodes) in the network.  These nodes will naturally be connected into hubs, 
most likely located within the country team for each foreign country which will be 
elaborated on later in this chapter.   
There are many challenges to the sort of network proposed here, especially 
when considering the need to operate in non-western environments.  Many similar SOF 
programs have been struggling with these challenges for several years.  One model which 
demonstrates the potential of SF nodes to overcome some of these challenges is found in 
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Drs. Tucker, Rothstein and Simons’ unpublished research at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.66  In their section on operations in the non-western world they address how a 
“force [like a SFGCIN] would complement the efforts of other in-country U.S. assets.”67  
One of their suggestions illuminates a significant advantage of employing the type of 
organization proposed here. They posit that this type of network would assist “FAOs 
(Foreign Area Officers), attaches, and other personnel – by working in areas where such 
personnel typically cannot spend sufficient time: in border areas, shantytowns, – in those 
places in society where trouble often brews.”68  Tucker’s, et al., model will be illustrated 
and explained in greater detail in a later section.  
Global insurgents recruit, seek refuge and operate in such environments, 
where few U.S. organizations are equipped or tasked to uncover and develop these 
critical areas.  In these environments the nodes of the network, positioned alongside their 
host nation counterparts, would be able to acquire knowledge which might lead to the 
eventual infiltration and exploitation of insurgent safe havens. Even beyond havens, this 
approach would help uncover insurgents everywhere they operate or try to infiltrate.   
The next section will explain how the nodes of the network will interact with the 
command and control or synchronizing hubs of the network. 
 
b. The Hubs in the Network 
The nodes play the role of sensors.  They can only have value if there is a 
clearing house or center to move, filter and share the information and knowledge they 
obtain from their operating environment.  The hubs of the network will perform the 
critical role of prioritizing, synchronizing, and processing the wide variety of information 
and knowledge from the nodes.  For the hubs to serve their role within the network, they 
should ideally be manned from the pool of SF field-grade officers who have served for 
several years as a node team leader.  The idea of having more senior personnel serve at 
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the periphery of a network borrows again from Alberts and Hayes Edge Organizations.69  
Manning the hubs and even the nodes of a network with field grade officers should help 
convince the higher, hierarchical military organizations, which will ultimately oversee 
this network, to trust the abilities and judgment of the network.  This would give them 
greater authority and autonomy to steer a counter-insurgent network within the 
challenging and amorphous insurgent warfare environment.   
As General John Abizaid, Commanding General of U.S. Central 
Command points out, “[the insurgency] is getting more organized, and it is learning.  It is 
adapting, it is adapting to our tactics, techniques and procedures, and we’ve to adapt to 
their tactics, techniques and procedures.”70  A peer-to-peer relationship between nodes 
and hubs, sharing information and intelligence through websites and other means would 
reduce many of the traditional hierarchical encumbrances which put many U.S. military 
organizations at a comparative disadvantage to their networked enemy.       
To keep the network from evolving over time into a more hierarchical 
(and thus less nimble and adaptable organization) the hubs will need to assess which 
nodes are more efficient and productive; they should have the authority to shift or 
reallocate human, technological, and material assets among the nodes and between the 
nodes and the hubs.  In their essay, “Multilateral Counter-Insurgency Networks”, John 
Sullivan and Robert Bunker point to the importance of redundancy and the ability to pick 
and choose the best hub or node to accomplish particular tasks.  They write,  
 
While individual hubs are important, and hubs with high capacity are 
critical, the workload must be distributed across the network to optimize 
resilience.  Multiple hubs, reinforced by clusters of nodes with distributed 
capabilities, can absorb both random failure and intentional attack.71 
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2004): 6, quoted in Brian Knowlton, “Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ War,” 
International Herald Tribune, 16 July 2003. 
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Although this is a tall order for the early stages of a field network with 
limited manpower and resources, it is an appropriate goal for a maturing network.  The 
composition and density of the network nodes would naturally need to allow for near 
constant adjustment based on the ever changing threat environment.  A flat network with 
mid to senior-level operators at the nodes and hubs of the network would outpace the 
innovation and adaptation of more traditional hierarchical organizations.   
At first, the most logical type of configuration for the proposed counter-
insurgent network would be Arquilla and Ronfeldts’ star or hub (Refer to Figure 1) 
“where a set of actors must go through that hub to communicate and coordinate with each 
other.”72  This is because of the natural chain of authority known and understood within 
all military organizations. As network theory and the potential of more radical 
organizational forms becomes more widespread and accepted within the military and 
SOF, the logical evolution would be towards an all-channel network, a “collaborative 
network of . . . groups where everybody is connected to everybody else.”73  The 
difference between the role of the hub in a Star or Wheel network and the role of the hub 
in an all-channel network is the hub's irrelevance in the latter.  The nodes' ability to 
interact with any other node or hub in the network and the knowledge of where they are 
makes a central hub less necessary for coordination. 
In the near term, a central hub for the proposed SFGCIN network would 
serve as a traditional military command and control hub, responsible for connecting the 
network nodes to each other and for coordinating with the hub’s peer and higher 
agencies.  These hubs would most likely be located within respective Country Teams, 
liaising with the agencies resident in every U.S. embassy, including the defense attaché, 
the military advisory group, intelligence agencies, and other organizations as appropriate.   
One significant difficulty will be determining command and control 
relationships.  The network hubs should be directly connected to the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), through their respective Theater Special 
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Operations Command (TSOC) with coordinating authorities from the Geographical 
Combatant Commands (GCC).  The details of these command authorities are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, yet they must be determined with the approval of respective Chiefs of 
Mission, as many of these very issues have been hindering similar SOF initiatives for 
many years now.  These challenges also involve inter-agency friction as were foreseen 
and addressed in many national and military strategy documents, specifically the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Report which states: 
 
Increasing unity of effort to achieve the nation’s security policy priorities 
across the agencies of the Federal Government is essential.  Only with 
coherent, leveraged U.S. Government action can the nation achieve true 
unity of effort with international partners.  To address more effectively 
many security challenges, the Department is continuing to shift its 
emphasis from Department-centric approaches toward interagency 
solutions.  Cooperation across the Federal Government begins in the field 
[emphasis added] with the development of shared perspectives and a better 
understanding of each agency’s role, missions and capabilities.74 
 
Another significant challenge involves the operational realities of gaining 
specific host-nation (HN) country approvals for this network to operate.  Equally as 
important is ensuring that the host-nation units selected are the relevant organizations 
regarding trans-national or local insurgent actors.  This means considering not just 
national counter-terror units, but border and coastal patrol forces as well.  While many of 
the early bi-lateral agreements might be extremely restrictive in nature, the long-term 
personal relationships engendered in the proposed network would be tasked to slowly, 
patiently overcome many of the administrative and operational limiting factors.   This 
already goes on everyday in other valuable SOF programs.  A foreign country’s national 
and military leadership would have to be convinced that their interests would be served 
by allowing varying numbers of these small SF teams (nodes) to be embedded with their 
                                                 
74 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, DC: Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2006), 84-85. 
  33
units in the field.  Not so much with the potential for U.S. combat operations, but with the 
potential to improve HN units’ and commands’ operational abilities - as well as the real 
U.S. knowledge developed on the insurgent environment in the little-known, yet critical 
regions of the globe. 
The physical location and the length of time served by the personnel 
manning the network hub is crucial because of the social bonds formed with the 
permanently assigned personnel in an embassy, which is basically a de facto family.    
This structure would give SOCOM a truly global, persistent presence at the personal and 
local level in the most critical regions of the world, but to be a success, the same factors 
of presence, trust, and influence must be achieved within the community of each U.S. 
embassy. 
 
2.  Operating the Network in a Non-Western Environment 
As stated earlier in this chapter, Drs. David Tucker, Hy Rothstein and Anna 
Simons developed a model which presents five considerations for U.S. personnel 
operating in the non-western world.  Their model highlights the importance of presence, 
trust and influence, which lead to intelligence and security.75  In this section, the five 
categories of presence, trust, influence, intelligence and security are applied to the 
proposed SFGCIN network.76 
 
a. The Power of Presence 
A global counterinsurgent strategy needs a vehicle to establish small, 
long-term human networks.  The size and attitude of this presence is of paramount 
importance.  The nodes in the proposed SFGCIN network would operate quietly as small 
teams, in the open - establishing a steady-state, low-signature presence in a country.  In 
the initial phase, as the SF team establishes their presence, they would conceivably 
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receive attention from the local populace, media, and even insurgent networks operating 
nearby.  Over time, once the small, seemingly benign nodes of the network have been in 
place for several months and eventually years, they would blend in with the day-to-day 
environment and become much less noticeable. A small team with their host nation 
counterparts could then move about within a country without raising suspicion because of 
their persistent presence.  Thus a small, sustained presence of culturally attuned special 
operators would not intimidate or threaten their host-nation counter-parts or be nearly as 
noticeable within the local environment.  Having a real, global persistent presence in the 
most remote, yet critical regions of the world answers many of the United States’ national 
strategy documents findings and is the first step to building the trust and relationships 
necessary for an effective counter-insurgent network.77 
 
b. Building Trust 
As small SF nodes move throughout the host nation, they will learn the lay 
of the land and develop relationships with key leaders, sharing their daily risks and 
privations.  Such shared experiences are the foundation of any good network, which is 
trust.  Once foreign military leaders and organizations learn that these men are committed 
to a long-term endeavor, they will eventually let down their guard and begin to share 
information.  The proposed SFGCIN would build bonds at the lowest levels within the 
field commands which have the most interaction with or near transnational insurgent 
areas of interest.  This might mean that to be of the most value, network nodes would be 
“married up” with units patrolling national borders, near refugee camps where global 
insurgents recruit, or in the slums and ungoverned regions of a country.  Tucker et al., 
explain the benefits of developing trust through long-term relationships: 
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What we have in mind by trust is not some generalized feeling of goodwill 
toward the United States or its personnel but personal relationships of 
mutual confidence built through sustained face-to-face contact.  Once we 
have established that trust we will find it easier to gather the intelligence 
we need to fight terrorism because we will have entered the human world 
where the terrorists live and operate.  As we build trust, we will also build 
influence.  As we build our influence and increase our intelligence, these 
efforts will begin to reinforce one another.78 
 
As the network nodes develop their relationships, social and cultural 
barriers will be lowered, allowing everyday conversations and relationships to turn 
towards problems shared by U.S. personnel and their host nation counterparts.  When 
other countries believe that their interests are valued and supported by the U.S., the most 
important characteristic of human networks will develop - influence.   
 
c. The Payoff – Influence 
Once a node element establishes a small, non-threatening presence and 
develops personal relationships based on trust and shared interests, the network will 
begin to produce results disproportionate to its size.  Before a SF field-grade officer 
deploys to a country or region, he should be given the national strategic goals for his area 
of operations and entrusted with the latitude to accomplish them.  The SF human network 
will be of greatest value in this phase.  The collecting and influencing nodes will be able 
to subtly exert personal influence, encouraging foreign military or governmental leaders 
to take action in America's favor.  A small team may gain the trust of a senior national or 
military leader and influence him to take a desired action in a specific scenario.  As 
acknowledged counterinsurgency expert, Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel David 
Kilcullen points out, "[t]raditional diplomacy, with its emphasis on treaties and 
geopolitical debates, is less relevant than the ability to understand and influence foreign 
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populations – not in the councils of state but in their villages and slums."79  Shared 
relationships and knowledge will be the sinew of this network, and each host-nation 
partner would always understand that their U.S. counter-part had the authority to either 
encourage or discourage greater U.S. intervention. 
 
d. Gleaning Information and Intelligence 
When positive presence, trust, and influence are being cultivated by nodes 
operating within the host nation’s borders, information and intelligence will be natural 
byproducts.  One of the most difficult tasks for westerners in foreign, non-western 
countries is learning to discern the cultural and human terrain specific to a country or 
region.  Non-western global insurgents count on this inability of traditional western 
military and intelligence forces to decipher foreign threat environments and “hide in the 
open.”  The average military personnel operating in a foreign country might walk by an 
active insurgent headquarters in a slum or remote tribal enclave and be none the wiser.  
By comparison, the nodes of the proposed SF network would work in the field for many 
years with local counter-parts.  Over time these personal, bi-lateral relationships will 
cause the U.S. SF node personnel to develop a more “native perspective”, thus becoming 
better able to decipher the local terrain and indicators.  Special Forces networks, sending 
data and information along with experienced, on-the-ground analysis back to higher 
headquarters, would provide a formidable weapon against America's asymmetrical, 
networked adversaries and help shrink the areas where terrorists can “hide in the open.”  
 
e. Considering Security 
The proposed SF network would have the potential to operate throughout 
the spectrum of conflict.  Higher intensity conflicts simply require increased risk 
mitigation factors shared with the host nation military counterparts.  While it may seem 
callous, the heightened risk to well-trained special operators would be worth the gain of a 
responsive and influential strategic human network.  An important function of this 
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proposed network is to foresee and understand situations better before they escalate into 
crisis.  If the U.S. must contend with a crisis, there would be a trusted network in place to 
assist with forces arriving from outside a country, with the potential to influence the 
outcome without resorting to the use of force.  The fundamental truth is that the 
environment where the global insurgency operates is of higher risk.  In order for a 
counter-insurgent network to learn, counter and eventually defeat the threat network, it 
must operate in close proximity to the threat network.  The maturity and skill-sets of the 
personnel being considered to lead this counter-insurgent network provide them with the 
most appropriate qualifications to operate and thrive in this complex and demanding 
environment.   
 
C. DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE SFGCIN 
 
1.  Personnel Considerations  
The qualities and traits of the personnel selected for the proposed counter-
insurgent network are at least as important as the network itself.  While the phrase “right 
man for the job” is often used in regard to selection for critical jobs and billets, more 
often than not, it is personnel availability and timing which ultimately determine the 
outcome.  The U.S. Army Special Forces majors population, at the time of this writing, is 
211 percent over strength. Army Special Forces must continue to be exacting about 
which personnel are selected for each assignment and even more so for a network such as 
the one proposed here to succeed.  A significant level of specificity is required to select 
the “right man for the job.” 80   
Counter-insurgency and unconventional warfare are highly specific and difficult 
specialties involving problems unlike those faced in traditional kinetic warfare.  No other 
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officers or non-commissioned officers in the Army are selected, trained and educated 
specifically for their ability to perform these ambiguous and challenging forms of 
warfare.  The Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 (DA PAM 600-3), Commissioned 
Officer Professional Development and Career Management highlights the many unique 
characteristics and attributes resident in SF and its officers.  Some of the most appropriate 
to this network are taken from the DA PAM 600-3: 
 
They [SF] provide military capabilities not available elsewhere in the 
armed forces.   
SF operations are frequently conducted through, with, or by indigenous 
forces. . . .  They interact closely and live under the same conditions as the 
indigenous people.   
Special Forces officers must: Be mentally flexible and willing to 
experiment and innovate in a decentralized and unstructured environment.  
Have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and develop 
and employ conventional or unconventional solutions.  Develop and 
employ non-doctrinal methods and techniques when applicable.  Be 
capable of decisive action for missions in which no current doctrine exists. 
. . . Be subject matter experts and [a] recognized authority in 
unconventional warfare, Joint and interagency operations, planning, 
operations, and intelligence as well as technical and tactical skills.81 
 
These characteristics should serve as a starting point and demonstrate anecdotally, 
the niche of Army SF in UW and COIN and its unique ability to succeed within the 
proposed network.   
Colonel Hammes discusses some of the specific opportunities and challenges of 
building just this sort of node and hub network.  In discussing networks, Hammes 
explains the difficulty in getting the right man for the job as well as the bigger 
organizational issues inherent in sharing information and knowledge across agencies: 
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Fortunately, the U.S. government has such experts.  Unfortunately, we 
have no coherent organization to find and deploy them.  Even if we can 
push our bureaucracy to find and deploy the right people, they still work in 
their individual departmental stovepipes.  Beyond getting the people to the 
field, we have to develop genuine networks to tie various agencies 
together in the field and in Washington.82 
 
These are just some of the challenges to finding the right personnel for the 
proposed network.  Yet this brief discussion should lend support to the belief that to 
defeat a global insurgent network will demand that the U.S. military put their most 
appropriate personnel towards this problem.  While all U.S. SOF personnel perform their 
divergent roles admirably, none are more suited to operate in a global counter-insurgent 
network then the men in Army Special Forces. 
 
2.  Duration of Duty Assignment 
Another necessary characteristic of the proposed network involves the duration of 
time served by personnel inside the network.  The United States' highest national policy 
and strategy documents acknowledge the changing nature and challenges of the emergent 
trans-national global insurgent adversary, yet many military and SOF foreign engagement 
programs (discussed in more detail below) are virtually unchanged since before 
September 11, 2001.  While these programs accomplish their intended missions, they are 
either short-term in duration or, if longer-term, serve a purely training or advisory role 
not linked operationally to a SOF headquarters engaged in the day-to-day counter-
insurgent fight.  These programs include the Joint Combined Exchange Training program 
(JCET), Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), and Security Assistance Training 
Management Organization’s (SATMO) initiatives. 
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In 2005, Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen “redefined the war on terror as a ‘global 
counter-insurgency’” in an article in the Journal of Strategic Studies.83  With the 
emerging characterization of the global war on terror as a global counter-insurgency, it 
seems appropriate that the networked approaches the U.S. military considers to counter 
insurgent networks be designed with the appropriate long-term perspective required for 
this kind of conflict. 
For the network nodes to have a presence in the field long enough to develop trust 
and influence, the one to six month duration of many SOF foreign engagement programs 
is inadequate.  The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that, “[l]onger duration 
operations will emphasize building personal relationships with foreign military and 
security forces and other indigenous assets to achieve common objectives.”84  Such 
“longer duration” programs are neither specified nor described.  A SF counter-insurgent 
network could be developed, stationing the best personnel in the most appropriate region 
and countries, but without a long-term commitment from the people comprising the 
network.  The end result would mean never reaching the network’s true potential.85   
 
3.  Factors of Proximity to the Threat Environment 
Lieutenant Colonel Kilcullen, State Department Counterterrorism coordinator 
Henry Crumpton, and anthropologist Montgomery McFate point out that if “the 
battlefield in the global counter-insurgency is intimately local, then the American 
government needs . . .  a “granular” knowledge of the social terrains on which it is 
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competing.”86  This seems intuitive in a war fought by non-state actors who operate and 
seek refuge in remote and ungoverned regions of the world.  The National Military 
Strategy recognizes the importance of “countering threats close to their source," adding 
that "[f]orces operating in key regions are essential to the defense of the United States 
and to the protection of allies and US interests.”87   
The necessity of “countering threats close to their source” is acknowledged, but 
many U.S. military and SOF initiatives, outside declared combat zones, have changed 
little since the Cold War.  If a strategic military leader were to take a snapshot of ongoing 
SOF programs and initiatives outside declared combat zones, he might be convinced that 
there is real global coverage appropriate to the perceived threats.  Simply put, there are 
enough unit or mission icons on the map to support this impression.  But a snapshot fails 
to capture the full story.  Often foreign nations are considered “covered” in the traditional 
military equation, if they have a Joint Combined Exchange Program that interacts with 
one of their military units once or twice a year.  Other foreign engagement programs 
show on the map as long-term coverage, even if the personnel manning the program are 
tied only to a training command with no way to leverage the personal relationships and 
networks they develop in performing their mission.  For the U.S. military to compete and 
eventually get ahead of the global insurgents decision-cycle we must ensure our missions 
and programs which profess a “global persistent presence” are more than icons on a map, 
but qualified personnel on the ground, in or near the threat, operating an adaptive and 
learning human network with enough consistency and longevity to be an asset.  The U.S. 
military cannot afford to take a TDY (temporary duty) approach to a long war problem. 
 
D. THE ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING A NETWORK IN THE OPEN  
The final key to this proposed counterinsurgent network would be the benefits of 
operating primarily in the unclassified arena.  In the contemporary operating environment 
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(COE), anyone with a cell phone camera can transmit a photo of U.S. commandos around 
the world on an internet blog or the mainstream media.  The advent of information age 
technology has greatly increased the difficulty of maintaining a secret U.S. military 
presence in a foreign country for a long-term initiative. 
Gregory F. Treverton, an expert on covert action, special activities, and 
paramilitary operations, analyzes U.S. post-World War II covert and clandestine 
operations, including the 1953 return of the Shah to Iran, the 1954 overthrow of Guzman 
in Guatemala, the Iran Contra affair and the Bay of Pigs invasion.88  While these are 
large-scale events, Treverton draws conclusions applicable to smaller-scale secret 
operations as well.89   
The first is that “[c]overt interventions, by definition initiated in secret, 
nonetheless eventually become public, usually sooner rather than later. . . secret decisions 
produce public results.”90  Treverton notes that decision makers often assumed that the 
hand of the U.S. government could be hidden from public view.91  While this might 
remain true for short duration operations, the ability for a single actor to communicate 
globally in the information age makes it increasingly difficult to keep covert actions from 
public view.  This is especially true when the target has an incentive to uncover and 
broadcast classified U.S. action to the broadest possible audience.   
Treverton also concludes that “[o]nce begun, even if small, [classified actions] 
still create commitments for the United States.”92  The benefit of the proposed network 
operating in the open is that there is no need for “shallow cover” or “plausible 
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deniability.”  In an information age replete with data mining, shallow cover is all too 
easily exposed.  If all long-term actions of the network are not secret, the U.S. 
government would not become committed to strategies which might go against its stated 
foreign policy goals.  If circumstances developed that made a short-duration classified 
operation necessary, the network, which has been in place for years and allayed 
suspicions of clandestine activity, would be the perfect platform to provide infrastructure 
support for a classified mission.  Writing in 1987, Treverton articulates a key 
generational shift from the early post-World War II era to today when he states,  
 
In the United States, after Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-Contra affair, 
neither the Congress, nor the media, nor the public is as prepared as in the 
1950s to accord presidents easy resort to covert action.  When reports of 
covert action play back to the United States from abroad, or surface in 
Washington, those reports are less likely to be dismissed.  When they are 
denied, the denials are less likely to be believed.93 
 
 What was true in the 1980s is even truer today. The growing likelihood and 
greater criticism of an exposed classified action puts even more emphasis on decisions to 
conduct long-term, classified operations.  This seems to suggest that while the challenges 
to the secrecy of large and long-term classified operations increase, the option of smaller-
scale and shorter-duration classified operations remains a reasonable option.  A long-term 
information network functioning in the open, yet manned by operators with the skills to 
conduct short-term classified missions appears most appropriate for the contemporary 
operating environment.  
Treverton’s evidence for the trend in classified actions is mostly anecdotal in 
nature.  Yet his book covers nearly thirty years of U.S. covert action throughout the 
world, highlighting early successes and later failures.  Three important points can be 
taken from what was true in 1987 when Treverton published his research.  First, 
classified U.S. commitments usually lead to widening involvement so as not to jeopardize 
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the initial classified actions.  Second, the public is more skeptical and less trusting of 
government justifications for classified action.  Finally, in comparison to the 1950s 
through 1980s, access to information and its means of dissemination has increased 
dramatically, further increasing the chances that a single actor might expose a secret 
action and rapidly find conduits to broadcast that information to a global audience.94   
All of this supports the idea that for Special Forces to man and operate a long-
term counter-insurgent network.  The task of gathering relevant and valuable open source 
information quietly, while “hiding in the open” would be more likely to succeed if there 
was no “secret network” to expose.   
 
E. CURRENT DOD FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS  
 
1.  Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) 
The DoD has several programs which share many of the characteristics of the SF 
human network proposed in this thesis.  The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 
sponsors the Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO), which: 
 
. . . plans, forms, prepares, deploys, sustains and redeploys CONUS-based 
Security Assistance Teams (SATs) to execute OCONUS Security 
Assistance missions in support of US National Security and National 
Military Objectives, Regional Unified Commands' Theater Security 
Cooperation Strategies and US foreign policy.95 
 
SATMO is comprised of highly trained soldiers and teams training and advising 
foreign militaries across the globe.  Many of its personnel have Army Special Forces or 
other SOF backgrounds.  Personnel operating within this mission often form small teams 
to live and train with important host nation military units for long periods of time, 
                                                 
94 Treverton. 
95 United States Training and Doctrine Command, Security Assistance Training Management 
Organization (SATMO); available from http://www.bragg.army.mil/satmo/msnstmt.html; Internet; 
accessed 13 December 2006. 
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consistent with the requirements for an effective network.  So while the SATMO program 
shares some of the same attributes of the SFGCIN, it is not tied into an operational SOF 
command tasked with fighting the global insurgency or organized along network lines.   
Additionally, Title 22 of U.S. Code prohibits this type of program from serving in a 
combat or combat advisory role, which logically limits this organizations role in an active 
counter-insurgent network.  The SATMO program does hold much potential to 
compliment the operations of a SF counter-insurgent network, specifically sharing the 
social bonds and links developed in U.S. to host-nation SATMO liaisons with the nodes 
of the proposed network.   
 
2.  Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program 
Another valuable DoD program is the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) 
program managed by SOCOM. The program has many characteristics necessary for a 
successful network.  It is manned by Special Forces soldiers, targeted at relevant host 
nation military units, and helps build multilateral military relationships between the U.S 
and its allies.  One of the critical short-comings of the JCET program is its short-duration.  
A JCET is typically only three to four weeks in duration; it fails to have the longevity 
suggested by the authors which is required for U.S. personnel to build the necessary 
social bonds with their host nation counter-parts, allowing them to truly know and 
understand the threat environment.  Also, most JCETs are not planned in “high threat” 
areas of foreign countries.  So whatever information is learned about a foreign area where 
a JCET is operating is usually of limited operational value for the GWOT.  This 
combined with the narrow mission scope and legislative restrictions prevent JCETs from 
being applied beyond their intended theater security cooperation and engagement goals.  
 
3.  Defense Attaché and Foreign Area Officer Programs 
The Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Defense Attaché (DAT) programs have 
historically proven very effective.  The DAT serves as the Secretary of Defense’s 
representative and is often the senior military advisor to the Ambassador on the 
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embassy’s country team.96  However the role and scope of a DAT is not conducive to 
leading a counter-insurgent network for many obvious reasons.  The majority of a FAO 
or DAT’s time is spent juggling myriad security assistance programs, military travel 
coordination, attending host nation military events and social engagements, mostly within 
the embassy or diplomatic enclave.  Their visits outside a capital are seldom of any long 
duration because of the real and pressing responsibilities in the capital, and are always of 
high concern and visibility to the host nation’s senior defense ministry officials.  The 
situation for SF elements in the proposed network would be vastly different from the 
environment of FAOs and DATs.  The nodes and hubs of the SF network would be 
primarily concerned with the areas away from the capital and diplomatic enclave, instead 
spending most of their time in the field, learning the hinterlands and remote tribal regions 
where terrorist insurgents seek refuge.  What the SF network learns could be shared with 
the DAT and FAO personnel in each country, allowing various DoD programs and 
initiatives to be better focused within each respective country.     
 
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE  
Since the events of September 11, 2001, many military options and strategies 
have been vigorously analyzed and considered, resulting in improvements in our nation’s 
counter-terror capabilities.  Yet more can be done.  To confront diffuse, networked 
insurgent organizations, the U.S. must adapt its more hierarchical organizations and 
empower small, local, and sustained networks of our own.  Small teams acting as the  
                                                 
96 An example duty description of a defense attaché is found on the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to 
Germany’s webpage which describes the DAT as: “the primary military advisor to the Ambassador and 
Country Team on military issues and developments within Germany. Additionally he represents the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and greater Department of Defense (DoD) 
elements; plans and coordinates U.S. military activities with the German Armed Forces throughout 
Germany (including coordination with DoD, Joint Staff, and USEUCOM); observes and reports on German 
military developments; oversees U.S. military training programs (including Foreign Area Officer in-
country training and the Personnel Exchange Programs); and supports DoD and other VIP visits.” U.S. 
Department of State, "The Defense Attachés’ Office (DAO)," United States Diplomatic Mission to 
Germany; available from http://berlin.usembassy.gov/germany/dao/index.html; Internet; accessed 15 
February, 2007. 
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nodes of an active hub or all-channel network would have the greatest access to the 
“ground truth” because of their proximity to the problem and the lens provided by their 
host nation counterparts.    
This subtle, less intrusive and indirect concept also has the potential to 
dramatically alter the way U.S. power is portrayed abroad, thus improving how America 
is perceived by allies and adversaries.  One way to achieve this metamorphosis, while 
simultaneously increasing American influence, is to empower a global SF human 
network embedded at the local level in or near the insurgent environment.  A small 
investment of human capital could fundamentally change how U.S. “presence” is defined 
and viewed.  This would simultaneously help with the greatest problem faced by our 
western military institutions – how to decipher the cultural and human terrain of remote 
foreign countries and thus narrow the dark spaces which provide safe harbor for 
America’s insurgent enemies.  At the same time, such a network would help change how 
U.S. power is exercised and perceived overseas, thus improving many of the bi-lateral 
counter-insurgent partnerships which are critical to understanding, exploiting and then 
defeating the global insurgent network. 
The next chapter will demonstrate where the most appropriate personnel can be 
found to build a Special Forces Global Counter-Insurgent Network, (SFGCIN) which has 
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IV. THE HUMAN RESOURCE DILEMMA – PRIORITIZING 
LIMITED HUMAN CAPITAL 
A. OVERVIEW 
The empirical data evidenced in this chapter will illustrate that there is a 
significant surplus of SF majors per year group (YG) as well as an increase in the time 
these officers will spend at this grade.  These two factors taken together should allow 
some portion of this surplus to support a global counter-insurgent network.  The 
relevancy of this argument within the context of limited human resource assets in the 
current Global War on Terror (GWOT) will be strengthened through the utilization of the 
economic principles of allocative and productive efficiency.   
This chapter briefly outlines the historical background regarding SF officer 
personnel issues of the recent past.  It considers the impact of the programmed growth 
within Army SF Groups and presents the most current predictions for future trends in the 




1. Surplus in the System 
The Army Special Forces branch is over-strength across all of its field-grade 
officer populations.  Within Special Forces, majors are currently 211% over-strength, 
lieutenant colonels are currently 158% over-strength, and colonels are currently 220% 
over-strength.97  These trends are expected not only to continue but to steadily increase 
over the course of the next decade.  
Human Resources Command (HRC) has an ideal pyramid which depicts the 
number of officers at each rank within the Department of the Army.  This personnel 
pyramid has served as a base model used historically to judge the health and constancy of 
various year-group officer populations over time.  Each branch within the Army also has 
                                                 
97 Special Forces Branch Brief (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Command, December 2006), 7. 
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its own distinct pyramid based on the fact that there are a different number of jobs at each 
rank in any given branch.  The dashed line in Figure 1 depicts the ideal Special Forces 
pyramid based on ratios determined by HRC.  The inner-most line depicts the number of 
current authorizations according to the Personnel Management Authorization Document 
(PMAD).98  The outer-most line depicts the actual inventory of officers on hand.  The 
disparity between the inner-most line depicting the authorizations and the outer-most line 
depicting the actual inventory graphically displays the surplus of field grade officers 
within the Special Forces branch, particularly at the rank of major.  In this study, the 
authors suggest that the actual pyramid may be considered ideal if these officers are put 
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Figure 2.   Special Forces Officer Pyramid99 
 
                                                 
98 The PMAD is a document that identifies force structure authorizations at the Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) and grade level.  It is produced semiannually.  For more information, see: “How The 
Army Runs (HTAR),” 25th ed. Chapter 15, 15-10, a, 2005-2006, available from http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/dclm/linkedtextchapters.htm; Internet; accessed on 19 December 2006, 341. 
99 Figure 2 was created by the authors from data presented by LTC Chris Karsner, CG, USASOC 
Briefing on Recommended Changes to 18A Force Structure, (Fort Bragg, NC: Directorate of Special 
Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006). 
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Despite the surplus of certain populations of officers within Special Forces, the 
branch remains overall under-strength in enlisted personnel.  In order to address these 
manning shortfalls and improve the capacity of Special Forces, United States Army 
Special Forces Command (USASFC) recently adopted a transformation initiative known 
as the Enhanced Special Forces Group (ESFG).  This will increase the overall size of the 
Special Forces groups over the next few years.  The ESFG states that its purpose is to 
“provide additional planners, trainers, coordinators, and sustainers to enable the Active 
Component (AC) Special Forces Groups to conduct sustained UW operations in multiple 
locations without augmentation or contractors.”100  This transformation will take place in 
three incremental bands.  ESFG Band I will add 97 positions per group, Band II will add 
156 positions per group, and Band III will add 457 positions per group.101  Band I and II 
will increase the battle staff and support capability of each group, which will logically 
increase the availability of SF qualified personnel for employment.102  Band III will 
provide the most significant element of this transformation through the addition of one 
SF battalion per group.103  The ESFG is a valuable and necessary initiative based upon 
the greater demand for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the ongoing GWOT.   
Although this initiative will create a greater requirement for SF officers by increasing the 
number of operational billets associated with the new SF units, this chapter will 
demonstrate that the trend of SF field-grade officers remaining over-strength will 
continue to increase. 
 
                                                 
100 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ODUSD(PI)(RQ), Defense 
Manpower Requirements Report: Fiscal Year 2006, July 2005; available from 
http://www.dod.gov/prhome/docs/DMRR_FY06.pdf; Internet; accessed on 8 December 2006, 67-68. 
101 LTC Jeffrey L. Kent, “SF Command Addresses Joint-Fires Shortfalls at the SF Group, Battalion 
Levels,” Special Warfare, Vol. 18, No. 1, July 2005, 24-27.  
102 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness ODUSD(PI)(RQ), Defense 
Manpower Requirements Report: Fiscal Year 2006, July 2005; available from 
http://www.dod.gov/prhome/docs/DMRR_FY06.pdf; Internet; accessed on 8 December 2006. 
103 BG John F. Mulholland Jr., “Unconventional Warrior: Interview with Brigadier General John F. 
Mulholland Jr.,” Special Operations Technology: Online Edition; available from http://www.special-
operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1387; Internet; accessed on 8 December 2006. 
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2. Utilizing Special Forces Personnel - Allocative and Productive 
Efficiency  
Robert R. Leonhard, a retired army Lieutenant Colonel and author of The 
Principles of War for the Information Age, borrows the concepts of allocative and 
productive efficiency from the study of economics.  Leonhard uses these principles to 
discuss the scarcity of resources and the seemingly infinite demands competing for those 
resources as an essential problem within the military.  He describes allocative efficiency 
as the military art which “dictates that we must properly allocate our combat power to the 
most important demands and leave other goals unresourced, or at least under-
resourced.”104  He defines productive efficiency as “combining available resources in 
such a way as to get the maximum output from consumed resources.”105  In line with the 
classic principle of economy of force, these two concepts epitomize the parameters which 
must be considered when employing an extremely valuable and limited resource.   
In a memorandum for the Commander of the Army Human Resource Command 
dated 8 September 2005, General Bryan D. Brown, Commanding General of United 
States Special Operations Command, outlined the personnel fill priority for Army Special 
Operations officers.106  Logically, Special Forces Groups are at the top of this list.  After 
the obvious requirements to man Army SOF commands and Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs), the remaining priorities are listed in order of declining relevance to 
the GWOT.  This directive is extremely useful as it allowed the Human Resource 
Command to fill billets for Special Forces officers in-line with the commander’s 
priorities. 
To add value to these priorities and decisions, Leonhard’s arguments for 
allocative and productive efficiency are particularly useful.  To maximize the impact of 
this small pool of seasoned UW and counter-insurgent (COIN) experts, the tenets of 
                                                 
104 Leonhard, 130-131. 
105 Ibid., 135.   
106 General Bryan D. Brown, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army Human Resources 
Command, “Personnel Fill Priority for Army Special Operations Officers, FY2006-2007,” (MacDill AFB, 
FL: United States Special Operations Command, 8 September 2005).   
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productive efficiency must be acknowledged; assigning (as Leonhard previously 
asserted) “available resources in such a way as to get the maximum output from 
consumed resources.”107  To realize the potential of allocating this finite personnel 
resource and its unique characteristics within a global SF counter-insurgent network more 
closely aligns the principles of allocative and productive efficiency, utilizing the best tool 
(human resource) against a global insurgency (demand), even at the expense of other 
lesser demands. 
 
C. A GROWING TREND                                                
From fiscal year 1996 to 2002, the accession goal of Special Forces officers was 
100 captains per fiscal year.  Between fiscal year 2002 through 2005, the accession goal 
of Special Forces officers increased to 105 captains per fiscal year.  This seemingly small 
increase was directed by Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, USASFC Commanding 
General during that time, based upon the fact that there were 270 Key Developmental 
(KD) positions for captains.  Serving as a Special Forces Operational Detachment - Alpha 
(SFOD-A)108 commander for two years divided the 210 SFOD-A positions into a 
requirement of 105 captains per year.  The remaining sixty positions were considered 
specialty commands, intended to be filled by senior captains after their first two years as 
a SFOD-A commander.109   
In order to meet the requirements of the ESFG initiative, the accession goal of 
Special Forces officers has increased to 155 captains per year beginning in fiscal year 
2006.  The additional battalion per group will increase the amount of SFOD-A 
commander positions from the current number of 270 to approximately 360 once the 
ESFG initiative is complete. Although the ESFG will create new positions, projections 
displayed later in this chapter will demonstrate that the increase in the number of officers 
                                                 
107 Leonhard, 134. 
108 The SFOD-A is the basic, tactical unit for Army Special Forces, comprised of twelve men with 
specific operational specialties.   
109 LTC Chris Karsner, SF Officer YG Production and Projection Models (Fort Bragg, NC: 
Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006), 2. 
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selected and trained through the Special Forces pipeline will more than make up for this 
difference, and that the surplus of senior officers will continue to increase.110   
Several factors have contributed to a recent increase in the SF field-grade officer 
population: higher accession rates, fewer Career Field Designation Board (CFD) 
removals, and most significantly, higher promotion rates.  In the past, SF basic year 
groups (YG) consisted of approximately 90 officers at initial accession.  Separations as a 
captain reduced this number to approximately 80 officers.  Promotion rates to major were 
approximately 85%, reducing this number to approximately 70 officers.  Finally, the 
Career Field Designation Board removed about 15-20 SF majors from the operational 
career field both voluntarily and involuntarily.  This resulted in a historical YG size of 
50-55 officers for SF majors,111 a trend which can still be seen today in YG 91 through 
93 officers as demonstrated in Figure 3 below.   


















Figure 3.   Special Forces Major Inventory112 
 
                                                 
110 LTC Chris Karsner, SF Officer YG Production and Projection Models (Fort Bragg, NC: 
Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006), 14. 
111 Ibid., 5. 
112 Special Forces Branch Brief (Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Command, December 2006), 13. 
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Recently, these figures have changed significantly.  YG 94 officers originally had 
100 captains assessed, 9 separated as captains, the promotion rate to major was 100%, 
there were no involuntary CFDs and only 12 voluntary CFDs, resulting in a population of 
approximately 79 majors.  YG 95 officers originally had 94 captains assessed, 11 
separated as captains, the promotion rate to major was 100%, there were no involuntary 
CFDs and only 13 voluntary CFDs, resulting in a population of approximately 70 majors.  
This change has resulted in the addition of approximately 20 officers per YG, a spike 
which is clearly demonstrated in Figure 3 above, beginning with YG 94.  This increasing 
trend will continue to expand the surplus of SF majors.  The sharp increase in the number 
of majors depicted in Figure 3 between YGs 1990 and 1991 is the result of the 
preponderance of all year groups prior to 1990 being promoted to the rank of lieutenant 
colonel.   
This dilemma of an increasing SF major population was compounded in fiscal 
year 2006, when the Army conducted two promotion boards for the rank of major.  
Starting with YG 96 officers, this reduced the pin-on time for promotion to major, a 
change which has essentially decreased the amount of time that officers will serve as a 
captain and increased the time that they will serve as a major by about one year.   
What this evidence suggests is that there will now be an additional year within a 
SF Major’s time in grade.  An SF Major now has the potential to attend the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) or Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) and 
then serve within the USSOCOM prioritized Key and Developmental (KD) billets in SF 
or SOF units (two years).  The authors believe that the additional year inside a Major’s 
time in grade will enable him to be allocated to serving within the authors’ proposed 
network in accordance with the core priorities for SF officers’ assignments as articulated 
by USSOCOM and HRC.  In personnel terminology, this would be referred to as a “post-
KD” job or one after an officer has met his institutional requirements for that grade. 
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In order to partially address the over-abundance of field grade officers, the 
Directorate of Special Operations Proponency is recommending several re-grades113 and 
re-codes114 to the Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), the 
document which prescribes the number of assigned personnel and equipment within 
Special Forces groups.  These recommended changes will essentially create more major 
positions and fewer captain positions within Special Forces.  Current proposals 
recommend the re-grade of the Group S3 from a major to a lieutenant colonel position 
and the following positions from captain to major: Group Assistant S3, Group HHC 
Commander, and Battalion HSC Commanders.   Special Forces Proponency is also 
recommending that the USASOC HHC Commander and Group Support Battalion 
Executive Officer positions re-code to SF major positions.115  Although these 
adjustments will help to slightly rebalance the ideal SF pyramid displayed earlier in 
Figure 2, future projections demonstrate how the inventory of majors will still continue to 
exceed authorizations.   
 
D. PROJECTED TRENDS                                                
The empirical evidence within this section has been gleaned from the experts 
within the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, who believe that this growth 
trend will continue for the foreseeable future.116  It is important to acknowledge that the 
statistics presented in this section of the thesis are projections.  While it is impossible to 
foresee exactly what will happen in the future, it is possible to make fairly accurate 
predictions based on previous and current information.  Although the ESFG initiative will 
                                                 
113 The term “re-grade” means a change in the rank or grade of the individual who fills a particular 
duty position.  For example, the Group S3 (Operations Officer) position is being recommended to change 
from an O-4 (Major) to an O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) position. 
114 The term “re-code” means a change in the required functional area of the individual who fills a 
particular duty position.  For example, the GSB XO position, currently held by a 90A or multifunctional 
logistician, is being recommended to change to an 18A or Special Forces position.   
115 LTC Chris Karsner, CG, USASOC Briefing on Recommended Changes to 18A Force Structure, 
(Fort Bragg, NC: Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006). 
116 LTC Chris Karsner (Directorate of Special Operations Proponency), in discussion with the authors, 
16 November 2006. 
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increase the size of SF units and the recommended re-codes and re-grades will slightly 
rebalance the current SF pyramid, the Directorate of Special Operations Proponency 
anticipates that the excess of field-grade officers will continue to grow throughout the SF 
branch.  
Table 1 also displays the increasing SF captain projections that are expected to 
result from the Band III growth that is currently under way.  It depicts the projected 
inventory of captains, the projected authorizations according to the Personnel 
Management Authorization Document (PMAD), and the projected authorizations with 
the recommended re-grades and re-codes previously mentioned.  This table also 
demonstrates the extensive time which is invested to train every captain in order to 
properly prepare him for the unique Special Forces missions; each year group of officers 
accessed will not report to a SF Group until two to three years after his initial selection 
and training begins.  This training, which is expanded upon by the officer’s operational 
experience, is what makes Army SF officers such a valuable asset within DoD and highly 
qualified candidates for the authors’ proposed counter-insurgent network.  Assuming that 
SF continues to meet its new accession goal of 155 captains per year, as evidenced by the 
“Gains to Force” in Table 1, the SF branch can be expected to reach 100% strength in 
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Table 1. Special Forces Captain Projections117 
 
This increase in captains strength, coupled with the 100% promotion rates and 
fewer CFDs among the last three year groups to be promoted to major, will continue to 
increase the surplus within the SF major population, as demonstrated in Table 2.  Table 2 
displays the SF major projections for the next twelve years.  Like Table 1, it depicts the 
projected inventory of majors, the projected authorizations according to the PMAD, and 
the projected authorizations with the recommended re-grades and re-codes. The “YGs in 
MAJs Inventory” column lists all of the year groups that compose the inventory of majors 
each fiscal year.  At the time these projections were made in November 2006, SF Majors 
were 194% over-strength.118  By FY 2018, it is projected that SF majors will be 246% 
over-strength, assuming that the re-codes and re-grades are approved.  If the 
recommended re-codes and re-grades are not approved, this surplus will be even greater.  
These projections make it evident that this personnel excess will continue and thus 
provide ample opportunity to employ this population within new and relevant initiatives.   
                                                 
117 LTC Chris Karsner, SF Officer YG Production and Projection Models (Fort Bragg, NC: 
Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006), 12. 
118 The most recent SF Branch Brief lists majors as 211% over-strength.  Special Forces Branch Brief 
(Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Command, December 2006), 7. 
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SF MAJ Projections
BAND III in FY08 and regrade of selected 18A positions from O3 to O4
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Table 2. Special Forces Major Projections.119 
 
Special Forces Proponency acknowledges this problem and the impact it will have 
within the SF field-grade officer population: 
 
Without significant force structure growth and the resultant increase in 
command or operational positions, those SF Majors afforded the 
opportunity to serve in an SF Operational or Training Group will be 
limited to roughly three-fourths of the YG population. However, other SF 
Major positions have been identified as key developmental which provide 
the equivalent necessary professional experience and development 
opportunities for future leadership responsibilities and successful service 




                                                 
119 LTC Chris Karsner, SF Officer YG Production and Projection Models (Fort Bragg, NC: 
Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006), 13. 
120 LTC Chris Karsner, SF Major Key Developmental Positions Brief (Fort Bragg, NC: Directorate of 
Special Operations Proponency, 16 November 2006), 12. 
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E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has focused on the empirical data gleaned from research at the U.S. 
Army Special Forces Human Resource Command, the Army Special Forces Proponency 
Division and other relevant agencies: specifically addressing how to man the proposed 
network.  The evidence supports a claim of this thesis: mainly that a portion of U.S. 
Army SF personnel, particularly the “Major” population, is not being utilized efficiently.  
A more imaginative and aggressive approach regarding the special operations 
contributions to the war on terror is warranted.   
Many of the statistics cited in this chapter represent a snapshot in time; these 
numbers are constantly changing.   As a result, the actual numbers from the projections 
cited in this chapter can be expected to vary; however, the evidence clearly supports the 
fact that the excess of SF field-grade officers is a trend which will not only continue but 
can be expected to increase over the next decade.   
Although there is clearly a surplus of field grade officers within Special Forces, 
this unique group of counter-insurgent and unconventional warfare experts remains a 
finite asset within the Army.  It is crucial as the Army engages a determined global 
insurgency that those field grade officers not serving in an operational or KD position 
should be utilized in jobs that will take maximum advantage of their requisite expertise 
and thus leverage their productive efficiency in the most advantageous regards to the 
Army and the global war on terror.   
The importance of finding less intrusive, more protracted ways to influence the 
Long War warrants the consideration of this type of networked, “small investment to 
large gain” initiative.  The current solution to manning other programs which are similar 
to the one recommended here can mainly be described as short-term and temporary in 
their manning concepts.  Many of these programs take the few officers who are assigned 
to operational SF Groups or Theater Special Operation Commands and pull them from 
their critical MTOE billet for short-term Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments in order to 
fill a deployed operational requirement.  Since there is not a current body or eligible pool 
of selected, qualified, and experienced SF officers set aside within the branch to conduct 
these assignments, this solution results in the worst-case scenario.  By taking a SF Major 
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from an operational, KD billet during his tenure to serve in a TDY capacity, SOF 
commands are deprived of a critical commander or staff officer for an extended period of 
time.   
This temporary approach ultimately hinders the outcome of both requirements.  
Because the losing unit cannot afford to give up its SF field-grade officer permanently, 
the mission taking this officer away from his actual KD position unavoidably takes a 
short-term approach to a problem, which demands a long-term commitment of effort.  
Rotating people through short, six-month deployments can never develop the trust and 
influence necessary to build a productive human network.  Once a new officer has served 
for several months in a liaison role with his host-nation counterpart, his TDY assignment 
is complete.  Then a new SF field-grade officer arrives to start over again, and the cycle 
continues, never realizing the potential that a long-term commitment would facilitate. 
Finally, the argument is not that the Army needs to radically change their current 
SF field-grade officer prioritization, simply apply some reasonable percentage of the 
excess strength present in the current and future force structure.  Another way exists to 
utilize this important human asset, which naturally complements the principles of 
allocative and productive efficiency demanded of a scarce human resource.  This would 
allow Special Forces to fill a critical niche in the global effort against a determined, 
networked adversary.  This will provide USSOCOM and the Geographical Combatant 
Commands with a real global persistent presence, able to provide valuable information 
from remote and austere locations in countries of interest which no other agency or 

















Earlier in this thesis, the authors analyzed the U.S. military’s fight against an 
irregular, networked terror adversary who seeks to asymmetrically attack traditional U.S. 
military strengths.  He does this through networked organizational forms, exploiting the 
power of social bonds as the sinew of these innovative organizations to exploit the 
inherent weaknesses of more hierarchical western military organizations. It is important 
to note that the enemy knows and understands what western military thinkers have been 
writing and talking about since the 1990s: mainly an emergent form of warfare 
previously identified as 4GW or netwar.  The enemy understands that “4GW is the only 
kind of war America has ever lost, and done so three times: in Vietnam, Lebanon, and 
Somalia.”121  Al Qaeda and its affiliates have not been idle with this knowledge.  In 
February of 2002 the online magazine Al-Ansar, a purported official al Qaeda website, 
published an article by Ubeid Al-Qurashi, a close aide to Osama bin Laden:122 
 
In 1989, some American military experts predicted a fundamental change 
in the future form of warfare. . . .  They predicted that the wars of the 21st 
century would be dominated by a kind of warfare they called “the fourth 
generation of wars.”  Others called it asymmetric warfare. . . . 
This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war 
machine and it can be expected that [Western] armies will change 
fundamentally.  This forecast did not arise in a vacuum – if only the 
cowards [among the Muslim clerics] knew that fourth-generation wars 
have already occurred and that the superiority of the theoretically weaker 
party has already proven: in many instances, nation-states have been 
defeated by stateless nations. . . . 
In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen triumphed over the world’s second most 
qualitative power at the time . . . . Similarly, a single Somali tribe 
humiliated America and compelled it to remove its forces from Somalia.  
                                                 
121 Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare,” in Rethinking 
the Principles of War, ed. Anthony McIvor (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 270. 
122 Ibid. 
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A short time later, the Chechen Mujahideen humiliated and defeated the 
Russian bear.  After that, the Lebanese resistance [Hezbollah] expelled the 
Zionists army from southern Lebanon. . . . 
Technology did not help these great armies, even though [this technology] 
is sufficient to destroy the planet hundreds of times over. . . . The 
Mujahideen proved their superiority in fourth-generation warfare using 
only light weaponry.  They are part of the people and hide among the 
multitudes. . . . 
Thus it appears that there are precedents for world powers and large 
countries being defeated by [small] units of Mujahideen over the past two 
decades, despite the great differences between the two sides. . . 123 
 
This is only one of myriad anecdotal examples available that demonstrate the 
nuanced understanding our enemy already has of the challenges and opportunities 
available in future conflict.  Some governmental and military departments have made 
progress since September 11, 2001, but have we done enough?  Much of our military 
industrial complex, weapons and systems procurement emphasis, and even personnel 
management philosophies remain fundamentally unchanged since the end of the Cold 
War.  If the enemy already has a good idea of our own western theories of future war, it 
becomes even more imperative that the U.S. military move to improve its ability to fight 
and win in an era of netwar. 
In his exceptional book on counter-insurgency, Learning to Eat Soup with a 
Knife, Colonel John Nagl explains just how difficult the task of changing from a 
traditional military mindset to one necessary to defeating an insurgency can be: 
 
Counter-revolutionary forces must also fight with ideas . . . Creating a 
political-military-economic strategy to defeat an insurgency is every bit as 
revolutionary as planning to overthrow a government, and a great deal 
more difficult. . . Gerald Templar created a revolution of his own in 
                                                 
123 Ubeid Al-Qurashi, “Bin Laden Lieutenant Admits to September 11 and Explains Al-Qa'ida's 
Combat Doctrine,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch – Jihad and 
Terrorism Studies, no. 344 (February 10, 2000); available from 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP34402;  Internet; accessed on 17 
February, 2007.  
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Malaya.  He encouraged innovation from below and demanded a new 
approach to solving problems of Malayan society.  He not only refused to  
focus exclusively on the insurgency as a military problem, but did not 
even see it primarily as such – and he insisted that all of his subordinates 
share that worldview.124 
 
This point is critical for the U.S. military and the future role of Army Special 
Forces in particular.  Few will argue that the American military is the preeminent armed 
force in the world, whether measured by budget, technology or training, yet this 
advantage in military resources is less and less the valued currency in 4GW.  That is 
because the traditional, nearly timeless military calculus of men and material which has 
been considered from Alexander, Hannibal, through Napoleon and today, no longer 
proves true in the current epoch of fourth generation warfare.  In an asymmetrical war, it 
does not matter that the U.S. owns most of the military resource advantages – al Qaeda 
and its affiliates are not fighting us along those same lines of operation.  In this war of 
asymmetry, the U.S. military must follow Gerald Templar’s example and create a 
revolution in military mindsets in the long war. 
This will mean encouraging, gleaning, and then implementing innovation from 
below – from the sergeants and captains and warrant officers with the experience of three 
and four tours of duty fighting terrorist networks in multiple theaters.  To cause this 
change in military mindset to occur, senior leaders must change, and communicate this 
change to every level of the military.  The fact that counterinsurgency is a difficult task to 
quantify means that the current measures of effectiveness, such as the numbers of targets 
killed or captured are not reliable measures of success.  The networked terrorist 
organizations arrayed against the U.S. are acephelous in nature, thus killing individual 
leaders is of limited value.   
                                                 
124 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 196.  
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This does not mean that every organization must be realigned along network- 
centric principles, to the contrary.  Higher, administrative commands performing 
regimented and recurring tasks are perfectly suited to maintain their hierarchical nature.    
Yet, for the organizations placed in the lead in the war against global insurgency 
it will be paramount to adapt and change those elements or nodes closest to the 
networked threat in order to become more aligned along small, dispersed network forms.  
Once this has been accomplished, the networked insurgent adversary will lose much of its 
asymmetric advantage.   
This is good news, as again Hammes points out, “[t]he inherent conflicts in such 
networked insurgencies [will] offer opportunities that can be exploited, but only by 
people with deep and current cultural and political understanding of the specific 
insurgencies.”125  The group of men most prepared to meet these important criteria is the 
currently under-utilized pool of Army Special Forces field-grade officers.  The fact that 
the Army Special Forces is currently more than 200% overstrength in field-grade officers 
suggests that a portion of these men could be more optimally employed in the global 
counter-insurgent network proposed in this thesis. 
By assigning the most qualified personnel within the most relevant organizational 
form, tied into a responsive operational command tasked with leading the global war on 
terror -- would allow the proposed SFGCIN to change the operational metric.  The nodes 
of the SFGCIN could apply the advantages of a U.S. SOF network, building strong social 
bonds of their own with indigenous peoples and militaries and begin to turn the tide from 
reactive to proactive measures, exploiting terror networks.  This is a powerful point and 
would mean a real, not simply rhetorical paradigm shift necessary to defeat a determined 
insurgency.  We must develop a network which would provide the knowledge of the 
cultural and human terrain, depriving the enemy network of its inherent advantage, thus 
allowing our networks to proactively exploit their exposed weaknesses.  
                                                 
125 McIvor and Hammes, 275. 
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There is still much to be done to build the proposed Special Forces Global 
Counter Insurgent Network, but there has certainly never been a more opportune time to 
apply the principles of allocative and productive efficiency with respect to the unique and 
valuable human resource resident in the Army Special Forces field-grade officer corps.  
This role could fill a unique and critical link in the broader, global war against terror 
networks for the foreseeable future.  This change cannot be realized by any amount of 
technological or resource advancement.  Instead it is a human resource and organizational 
turn of mind that is required.  Hammes reminds us that, 
 
Western forces have tried to substitute technology for human connections.  
This is a fundamental difference [with our enemy] that must be recognized 
in the West.  Once recognized, it should result in major efforts to build 
similar human networks among allies and neutrals when we are fighting a 
networked insurgent.126  
 
The United States Army has the most appropriate personnel in its Special Forces 
to build a powerful human network capable of challenging the global insurgent network.  
Our enemy is unequivocal in their focus and determination to bring every tool to bear 
against the United States to achieve their ends.  For the U.S. to prevail in this global 
conflict we must be equally determined to evolve and adapt our response to the greatest 
struggle of our time. 
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